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4INRA - LAMETA, Mabel.Tidball@supagro.inra.fr.ABSTRACT.- This paper develops a two-country general equilibrium model with endogenous growth
where governments behave strategically in the provision of productive infrastructure. The public capitals
enter both national and foreign production as an external input, and they are …nanced by a ‡at tax on
income. In the private sector, …rms and households take the public policy as given when making their
decisions. For arbitrary constant tax rates, the dynamic analysis reveals two important features. Firstly,
under constant returns, the two countries’ growth rates di¤er during the transition but are identical
on the balanced growth path. Secondly, due to the infrastructure externality, assuming away constant
returns to scale a country with decreasing returns can experience sustained growth provided that the
other grows at a positive constant rate. Then we endogeneize tax rates. It is shown that both a Markov
Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) and a Centralized Solution (CS) exist, even when the parameters allow for
endogenous growth, therefore explosive paths for the state variables. Nash growth rates are compared
with the centralized rates. We show that cooperation in infrastructure provision does not necessarily lead
to higher growth for each country. We also show that, in some con…gurations of households’ preferences
and initial conditions, cooperation would call for a slowdown in the initial stages of development, whereas
strategic investments would not. Lastly, depending also on the con…guration of preferences, we show that
cooperation can increase or decrease the gap between countries’ growth rates.
Key words: infrastructure, transboundary externalities, strategic behavior, endogenous growth
JEL codes: D9, E6, H5, C73.
11 Introduction
Do governments invest too little in public infrastructure? Do they thereby give up important
opportunities to generate growth? More precisely, what are the consequences, as far as growth
is concerned, of lacking cooperation in public investments made by uncoordinated countries?
In our mind infrastructure refers more speci…cally to green infrastructure, as measured by the
‡ow of public expenditures to …nance puri…cation stations for air or waters, though a more
comprehensive list typically includes sewer systems, roads, public transports, airports, harbors,
hospitals, public schools, public sectors R&D, military buildings and so on...
The interest in these questions dates back at least to Arrow and Kurz’s path-breaking book
(1970), but it was sparked again 20 years later by Aschauer’s empirical papers (1989a, 1989b),
who suggested a very powerful role for public infrastructure in the productivity of private capital
and lamented an under-investment problem in the United States. As surveyed by Gramlich
(1994), because of mixed evidence regarding the level of impact, a more balanced view has
developed, where public capital does a¤ect growth, though probably less strongly than initially
suggested.1
On its theoretical side, this literature attempts to clarify the economic role of public in-
frastructure. To do so, it often introduces it as an externality in the production activity. Dif-
ferent versions exist, depending on whether public infrastructure enters as a ‡ow or as a capital
into the production function, whether there is congestion, whether there are constant returns to
the augmentable factors, and so on. The insights one can expect from this approach are about
the nature of dynamic responses of macroeconomics variables, such as consumption, output, un-
employment, interest rates, etc. after a change in the public investment decisions. The insights
are also about the policy implications of the suboptimality of decentralized private decisions
(because of externalities) and about the issue of optimal size of the public sector. Regarding the
latter, the taxation to …nance public infrastructure typically has two opposite e¤ects: …rst, a
higher tax rate means, ceteris paribus, larger public capital, so higher rate of private pro…t and
growth; but second, it reduces the incentives of private activities and therefore growth. Clearly,
there is an optimal tax rate. But those policy implications are far too simple for they neglect
possible failures in the public sector itself, due to external e¤ects that may spread far beyond
the area of competence of local public decision makers. For those situations, a well-grounded
approach would …rst identify a benchmark investment path, with a normative appeal that takes
into account overall economic e¤ects, against which any uncoordinated investment plans could
be compared. This is the challenge of this paper.
Research by Barro (1990), Glomm and Ravikumar (1994), Devereux and Mansoorian (1992)
and Shibata (2001) has some bearing on the above concern. Shibata (2001) analyzes a partial
1With annual data on the United States from 1949 to 1985, Aschauer …nds an elasticity of aggregate product
with respect to public capital as high as 0.39, actually higher than the elasticity with respect to the private capital!
2equilibrium model where two decision makers strategically choose their public investments. The
role played by the information structure is emphasized. If policy makers can commit to invest-
ment paths, that is if they use open-loop strategies, competition ends up in only one equilibrium
with growth. If policy makers use markov strategies, there are multiple equilibria, some with
growth, others without. But no comparison is made between those non cooperative equilibria
and Pareto optimal paths to assess welfare losses. Anyway, such a comparison would be subject
to usual criticisms of welfare analysis in partial equilibrium models; besides the direct e¤ect
on production, public investment also alters the trade-o¤s between private investment and con-
sumption, at home and abroad, which has an e¤ect on equilibrium prices that in turn a¤ects
trade-o¤s and so on... All those indirect general equilibrium e¤ects should also be accounted
for when estimating the consequences of lack of cooperation in public sectors. Barro (1990)
and Glomm and Ravikumar (1994), in continuous and discrete time formulations respectively,
do handle general equilibrium frameworks, but with only one country, therefore no cooperation
issue arises in their analysis. To our best knowledge, Devereux and Mansoorian (1992) is the
only analysis of strategic interactions in a growth model with general equilibrium e¤ects. How-
ever, in this important paper strategic interactions are static, which in a dynamic model fails to
capture important inter-temporal trade-o¤s, and countries are identical. Finally, there is a bulk
of literature dealing with interacting countries within dynamic models but without endogenous
growth, i.e. with only transitory growth. For a synthesis, see Turnovsky (1997); Chapters 6 and
7 are devoted to the impact of exogenous policies in two-country models; Chapter 8 deals with
endogenous and strategic public policies.
In this paper we begin to …ll these important gaps in the theoretical literature. More precisely,
we examine the consequence of the lack of cooperation among governments in the …rst framework
that combines:
i) general equilibrium e¤ects,
ii) heterogeneity of preferences and technologies,
iii) endogenous growth,
iv) interdependent countries with dynamic non cooperative behaviors,2.
It is relatively easy to construct ad hoc dynamics with surprising properties. But it is more
useful, and demanding, to nest such dynamics into a meaningful model with micro-foundations,
so that particular growth regimes could be associated with well-identi…ed economic logics, and
their normative properties be assessed. Fortunately, this turns out to be possible in a two-
country general equilibrium model with endogenous growth. Public capitals enter both national
2Shibata (2001) captures points iii) and iv), Barro (1990) or Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) captures points i)
and iii); some papers like Datta and Mirman (2000) deal with i);ii) and iv). Devereux and Mansoorian (1992)
has points i);iii) and partially iv). But no paper, before the present one, encompasses i);ii); iii) and iv).
3and foreign productions as an input which is external for …rms. Those public capitals are …nanced
by a ‡at tax on incomes of households who have preferences de…ned over consumption of both
the domestic commodity and the good produced abroad. The analysis delivers a range of results,
in particular:
1. under speci…c conditions, there is too little (respectively too much) balanced growth at a
Markov Perfect Equilibrium, compared to the centralized solution, when consumers prefer
the domestic good (respectively the foreign good);
2. when households value more the foreign good than their domestic good, cooperation may
call for downsizing of the economy in the early stage of development, whereas strategic
investments would not; this possibility occurs under a range of initial imbalances between
private capital stocks;
3. in the case of bilateral technological externalities, the assumption of constant returns to
scale forces countries to tend to the same balanced growth rate despite their heterogeneity,
a property that rules out a widely used argument to explain the observations of di¤erent
growth rates;
4. relaxing the assumption of constant returns to scale, countries experiences di¤erent bal-
anced growth rates; and cooperation increases (respectively decreases) the gap between
countries’ growth rates when households value more (respectively less) their domestic good
than the foreign good.
The discussion develops as follows. Section 2 constructs a dynamic general equilibrium model
with two interdependent governments. Section 3 …x arbitrary constant tax rates for governments,
and derives the implications as far as growth is concerned. It does so both for the special case of
constant returns to scale in both countries and for more general situations. Section 4 endogeneizes
the constant tax rate policies, by considering two possible rationales for …nancing public capitals:
a non cooperative one and a centralized one. Section 5 then compares the resulting tax rates
to assess the consequences of lacking cooperation on growth rates. Section 6 summarizes the
results. When too technical or too long, proofs are relegated to an appendix .
2 Public infrastructure in a two-country model
A general equilibrium model with two countries or regions will serve as a conceptual vehicle
for the analysis (in the rest of the paper we use the terms country and region interchangeably).
Within each country, a representative …rm and a representative consumer form the private sector,
whereas a local government captures the logic of the public sector.
42.1 Agents
2.1.1 Firms
The representative …rm in country i produces a homogenous good (Yi), which can be consumed
locally (cii) or abroad (cji)3, or invested (Ii). The production technology uses two private inputs,
capital (Ki) and labour (Li); local public infrastructure (Gi) enhance the productivity of the
private factors, and for this reason they can be considered a production factor. In addition,
infrastructure generates cross-border spillovers, which means that the production possibilities of
a country are a¤ected by the infrastructure Gj of the other country. Formally, those assumptions









it ; i;j = 1;2; (1)
with ￿i; ￿i and ￿i 2 [0;1]. This formulation, in particular the way public capitals enter into the
productive process, is representative of many situations of interest.5
The transboundary externality Gjt is akin to an additional and costless input for country i.
All the production factors are immobile6.
Firms are competitive: they take as given the factor prices, the levels of infrastructure and
3From now on, whenever i and j appears in the same expression, it is implicitely assumed that i 6= j.
4This Cobb-Douglas formulation for production functions is widely used. Yet it implies foreign infrastructure is
a necessary input, which may or may not be a sensible property, depending on the particular kind of infrastructure
one has in mind. One may impose however that public capitals never reach zero values. This would be an innocuous
constraint since, as derived in Section 3, the production of infrastructure is always positive. Or similarly, it is as if
the technology were of the following form, with the possibility of positive production at zero foreign infrastructure:
Yit = AiG
￿i





it ; "i > 0; i;j = 1;2; i 6= j:
5Another possibility would be to assume that regions contribute to the same global stock of infrastructure Gt,






it for i = 1;2. For example, the …nancing of the european
aviation transportation industry (EADS, AIRBUS) is a kind of public investment that involves many countries
and that has repercussions on productions in all these countries. Admittedly, this "public good" option captures
a smaller set of situations. Later in the paper (Section 4.1, footnote 10) we will indicate the consequences of this
formulation.
6Actually, we have investigated the two di¤erent approaches used in the macrodynamics literature to formulate
capital mobility. The …rst option follows the lead of Devereux and Mansoorian (1992) by adding a market for
international …nancial assets to the present framework. This is indeed the most mobile form of capital. It turns out
that this extended set-up has no e¤ect at all provided one assumes identical preferences. But beyond symmetry,
very little can be said in our framework, for technical reasons (details are available upon request). The second
approach, notably proposed by Barro et al. (1995) and Bianconi and Turnovsky (1997), considers only physical
capital mobility. In that framework too, assuming symmetry does not change the results delivered in the simpler
model without mobility, and obtaining analytical results becomes impossible under heterogeneity (details are also
available from the authors). In both cases then, capital mobility entails mathematical limitations and commands
to restrict the analysis to the symmetric equilibrium, where mobility has no e¤ect.











it ￿ witLit ￿ ritKit ; (2)
with wit the wage rate and rit the interest rate. Under the assumption of complete depreciation
of capital after one period, pro…t maximization ends up in the usual equality between prices and
marginal productivities :



















In country i, consumption and investment decisions come from a representative in…nitely-lived
household. His utility in each period is de…ned over the consumption of the two commodities
produced in the economy, according to:
Ui(ciit;cijt) = ￿i lnciit + lncijt ; (5)
where ciit (resp. cijt) corresponds to the consumption of the domestic (resp. foreign) commodity,
and ￿i > 0 is the relative weight given to the local commodity. In the following, it will be crucial
to distinguish the situations where the representative household values more the domestic good
(￿i > 1), from the situations where it values more the foreign good (￿i < 1). The second
possibility is more likely to occur when the foreign good ful…lls basic needs while the domestic
good satis…es more evolved needs. By contrast, for similar products utility functions would re‡ect
a form of national preference.
Since the two commodities are di¤erent, there is trade on two interregional markets. Trade
activities create a second source of externalities between countries. Let us denote pt as the
relative price of the foreign commodity7 and ￿it the income tax rate. The representative agent
supplies inelastically one unit of labor, and earns the returns on investment. His total income
(net of taxes) is used for the purchase of the two commodities and for the investment in capital,
over the life-cycle:
Kit+1 = (1 ￿ ￿it)(witLit + ritKit) ￿ ciit ￿ ptcijt : (6)
Is is worth noting that the budget constraint depends on the regional government taxation
policy, which the agent takes as given.
The agent allocates his resources between consumptions and investment to maximize the sum





￿t (￿i lnciit + lncijt) (7)




t=0 ; subject to ciit;cijt;Kit+1 ￿ 0; 8t; and the budget constraint (6).
To summarize, the consumer has to cope with two distinct trade-o¤s. First, there is the classical
question of how to allocate optimally his consumption possibilities over time, i.e. the optimal
choice between current consumption and investment. Then there is the question of how to split
optimally his consumption expenses between the home commodity and the foreign one.
For reasons to be clari…ed later, we shall impose, 8i = 1;2:




which means that the inverse of the discount factor, ￿￿1 > 1; places an upper bound on returns
to scale. However, this does not rule out increasing returns.
2.1.3 The public sector
Each local government is responsible for the …nancing and production of the local public in-
frastructure. To do so, it levies a share ￿it 2 [0;1] of the representative agent’s income. The
focus of the paper is on infrastructure as ‡ows of public expenses, therefore:
Git+1 = ￿it(witLit + ritKit) : (9)
Once pro…ts are maximized, the resulting quantity of the public capital can be expressed as










The following section studies the competitive equilibrium. The constraints and trade-o¤s in
the private sector are detailed.
2.2 The equilibrium
Given an arbitrary vector of public policies ￿ = f￿it;Git;￿jt;Gjtg1
t=0, a world competitive equi-
librium makes consistent all the decisions undertaken in the private sectors.








(i) agents, in each country, are at their optimum,
(ii) the factor markets clear: Lit = Ni = 1, Kit+1 = Iit 8i = 1;2,
(iii) the markets of goods are balanced, i.e. the relative price pt is such that cijt = (1 ￿ ￿jt)Yjt￿
Kjt+1 ￿ cjjt.
72.2.1 Two arti…cial problems
Inspired by Glomm and Ravikumar (1994), it is possible to formulate two arti…cial problems, one
for each country, with their solutions giving the demand functions for the consumption goods





￿t(￿i lnciit + lncijt) ;
s:t:
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Appendix A shows the unique solution to those planning programs consists of linear functions







































Proposition 1 Assume the sequences fGitg1
t=0 and fGjtg1
t=0 are bounded above respectively
by f￿tGi0g1
t=0 and f￿tGj0g1
t=0 for some ￿ ￿ 1. Then, the sequences of individual decisions
fciit;cijt;cjit;cjjtg1
t=0 given by (12), (14) and (15), and aggregated variables fKit;Kjtg1
t=0 given
by (13), are the unique solutions to the arti…cial problems.
Proof. Follows the same logic as Glomm et Ravikumar (1994).
The foreign consumptions, (14) and (15), depend on the relative price pt. To characterize
completely the decisions, it remains to determine the equilibrium prices on the markets for those
goods.
2.2.2 The equilibrium relative price
At the equilibrium, supply and demand for good j are identical, i.e.
(1 ￿ ￿jt)Yjt ￿ Kjt+1 = cijt + cjjt :
Given the demands (14) and (12), evaluated for j, the equilibrium price is therefore:
pt =



























for i;j = 1;2. Those consumptions appear, at each date, as fractions of the foreign productions.
The following section studies the growth of the economy at the equilibrium, for arbitrary
constant tax rates. Later in the paper we will endogenize those public policies (Section 4), by
focusing on non cooperative behaviors of regional governments, with the purpose of comparing
the Markov Perfect Equilibrium with the centralized solution.
3 Growth under stationary decision rules
Under constant tax rates implemented in each country, the dynamics in the private and the
public sectors are:





















= ￿i ; 8i = 1;2; (20)
which means that the infrastructure-capital ratio is constant over time. Thus, private and public
capitals stocks grow at the same rate. The study of the economic dynamics then boils down,
for instance, to the analysis of capital accumulation. Substituting the expression of Git given by

















for i;j = 1;2.
Expressions (21) and (22) summarize the dynamic links between the two countries. Clearly,
country i’s conditions of growth will depend not only on the technology parameters (and partic-
ularly the returns to scale) but also on public policies undertaken in each country (through the
coe¢cient ￿i).
In the rest of this section, we scrutinize economies with constant returns to scale before
considering more diversi…ed economies, where one country has diminishing returns while the
other country has increasing or constant returns.
93.1 Economies with constant returns and catching up
The literature on endogenous growth, with a single independent country, has focused heavily on
the assumption of constant returns to scale for a reason that appears clearly from expression
(21). Setting ￿i = 0 to rule out cross-country technical links, ￿i + ￿i = 1 is necessary for the
dynamics to follow a balanced growth path (BGP in the sequel). With ￿i+￿i < 1; capital stocks
converge to steady state values and there is no growth except in the transition. With ￿i+￿i > 1;
capital stocks grow at an ever increasing rate.
At least for the purpose of comparison with this literature, in this section we also assume
constant returns with respect to the augmentable factors:
￿i + ￿i + ￿i = 1; ￿i > 0; 8i = 1;2 : (23)
3.1.1 Long term growth versus transitory growth
The imbalance of the initial conditions in the capital stocks is crucial to explain the transition.
De…ne the variable ut = Kit = Kjt as a measure of imbalance: From equality (23), ￿i+￿i￿￿j =


















The solution fe utg1




being monotonic and increasing (resp. decreasing) when u0 < ~ u (resp. when u0 > ~ u).




￿ 1; k = i;j:
Inserting Kjt = Kit = ut into (21), and using the fact that ￿i + ￿i + ￿i = 1; one can get the






￿ 1 ; (26)
gjt = ￿ju
￿j
t ￿ 1 ; (27)
lim
t!+1
git = gi = lim
t!+1






j ￿ 1 : (28)








10For any tax rate ￿￿i ￿ ￿i ￿ ￿i ; one has ￿i ￿ 1; therefore under constant returns to scale
gi ￿ 0;8i = 1;2
Proof. see Appendix B.
The two above conditions on parameters are su¢cient to ensure, for taxes in the speci…ed
intervals, that each country grows in the long run at a positive constant rate since the parameters
￿i, the constant part of the growth rates, are greater than one.
Once these conditions are set, we are able to deal with the di¤erences in growth rates.
Proposition 3 Assume constant returns to scale. The two countries’ growth rates di¤er during
the transition but are identical in the long run.
Proof. see expressions (26), (27), (28).
So, in contrast with Glomm and Ravikumar (1994), there exist transitional dynamics. Due
to the existing heterogeneity, both in terms of public policies and initial endowments in capital,
the two countries experience di¤erent growth paths during the transition. In fact, it is possible
to distinguish several cases, depending of the initial imbalance:
Proposition 4 Assume constant returns to scale and positive long run growth rates: Then:
1. when the initial imbalance falls short of the long run imbalance, u0 < ~ u; the sequence of
growth rates in country i is decreasing while the sequence of growth rates in country j is
increasing. Besides, when u0 < ￿
￿ 1
￿j
j , growth rates are always non negative in country
i, git ￿ 0; but country j experiences an initial downsizing of its private sector, i.e. there
exists a date t such that gjt < 0; 8t < t and gjt ￿ 0; 8t ￿ t. When ￿
￿ 1
￿j
j ￿ u0, growth
rates are always non negative in both countries, git ￿ 0;gjt ￿ 0.
2. when the initial imbalance exceeds the long run imbalance, ~ u < u0; the sequence of growth
rates in country i is increasing while the sequence of growth rates in country j is decreasing.
Besides, when u0 < ￿
￿ 1
￿j
i , growth rates are always non negative in country i, git ￿ 0; but
country j experiences a initial recession of its private sector, i.e. there exists a date t such
that gjt < 0; 8t < t and gjt ￿ 0; 8t ￿ t. When ￿
￿ 1
￿j
i ￿ u0, growth rates are always non
negative in both countries, git ￿ 0;gjt ￿ 0.
Proof. see Appendix C.
To summarize, according to the initial gap in capital endowments and the sequences of tax
rates, one of the two countries grows at an increasing rate while the other country’s growth
rate is decreasing until a common BGP is reached. And one country can experience an initial
reduction of its private sector, as measured by the stock of private capital, depending on the
11initial imbalance. However, this is not necessarily synonymous of an economic recession: output
may growth despite the reduction of the domestic capital, for at the same time the foreign capital
increases, so does the positive externality and output may rise.
We conclude this section with the two most important comments on Proposition 3, in relation
with observed data:
1. in the long run, both countries follow the same BGP since their initial di¤erences progres-
sively vanish. This important property contradicts previous arguments found in the litera-
ture to explain empirical observations of di¤erent growth rates for di¤erent countries, or the
lack of ￿￿convergence8. From conceptual frameworks using single independent countries,
this stylized fact is explained by di¤erent technological or preference parameters (see for
instance Glomm and Ravikumar, 1994, on page 1182, or Mankiw, 1995). Interdependency
of economies with constant returns to scale rules out such an explanation. Production
possibilities in such a case cannot be considered at the regional level. Rather they are
linked in such a way to form a unique production set at the interregional level, despite
local di¤erences. But, relaxing the assumption of constant returns in one country, we shall
discover in the following section other explanations for di¤erent growth rates.
2. The data say there is evidence of conditional ￿￿convergence9 within homogenous regions.
This stylized fact has been used by some authors to dismiss (some) endogenous growth
models (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995, Evans, 1996). However Howitt (2000) has shown
that the Schumpeterian endogenous growth theory with R&D spillovers is consistent with
evidence. Proposition 3 shows that the explanation can also come from the role played by
public infrastructure, under the reasonable assumption of interdependent countries.
3. the property that under some conditions countries converge to the same growth rate does
not mean of course that they eventually share the same income levels. Heterogeneity across
countries end up in permanent income di¤erences, even if they follow parallel growth paths
in the long run (again, see Howitt, 2000). Of course this conclusion also hold when countries
do not reach the same growth rate (see the next section).
3.2 Economies with di¤erent balanced growth rates
The economy just analyzed has two distinguishing features: bilateral externalities and constant
returns to scale. It is important to unravel the role played by those speci…cities in the striking
result of di¤erent countries having the same BGP.
8There is ￿-convergence if the cross-sectional standard deviation of real GDP per head for a group of economies
is falling over time.
9There is ￿-convergence if poor countries tend to grow faster than rich ones
123.2.1 Relaxing the assumption of constant returns to scale
One may investigate …rst the dynamic properties of the system (21) when the assumption of
constant returns to scale is relaxed. Working with growth factors, the dynamics are:
(
1 + g1t = (1 + g1t￿1)
￿1+￿1 (1 + g2t￿1)




20 ￿ 1 ;
1 + g2t = (1 + g2t￿1)
￿2+￿2 (1 + g1t￿1)





From well-established properties of planar systems (see for instance Azariadis, 1993, Chapter
4), some conclusions immediately follow. Under decreasing returns, ￿i + ￿i + ￿i < 1; the steady
state with no growth, git = 0; is globally stable. With constant returns, as previously shown
both economies converges to the same BGP. More interesting are of course the possibilities for
other steady states growth rates. A necessary condition for their existence is
(1 ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿1)(1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿2) = ￿1￿2 : (29)
We discard the cases where one or both countries exhibits constant returns with respect to its
national factors, and the cases where ￿1 = 0 and/or ￿2 = 0: The details about those last cases are
postponed to the next subsection, where the important situations of unidirectional externalities
are discussed.
When (29) holds, ￿1+￿1 6= 1; ￿2+￿2 6= 1 and ￿1;￿2 6= 0, there is a one-dimensional manifold
of steady states de…ned by
1 + gj = (1 + gi)
1￿￿i￿￿i
￿i : (30)
In our two-country framework, equality (29) is a key condition for positive balanced growth rates.
As in two-sector models of endogenous growth (see Mulligan and Sala-I-Martin, 1993), it does
not imply constant returns to scale. For instance it is consistent with diminishing returns in
country 1 provided it is o¤set by appropriate increasing returns in country 2 : ￿1 +￿1 +￿1 < 1,
￿2 + ￿2 + ￿2 > 1 and (29) hold together: But if there are constant returns in one country, there
must be constant returns in the other.
Condition (29) does not imply either that long run growth rates be identical, except when
there are constant returns to scale in both countries, thus (1 ￿ ￿i ￿ ￿i)=￿i = ￿j=(1 ￿ ￿j ￿ ￿j) =
1, or when the parameters are such that ￿1 + ￿1 = ￿2 + ￿2 and ￿1 = ￿2.
The stability of those steady states for growth rates can be inferred from the topologically
equivalent linear system that obtains by logarithmic transformation, ut = log(1 + g1t); vt =























It has eigenvalues ￿1 = 1 and ￿2 = ￿1 + ￿1 + ￿2 + ￿2 ￿ 1: Stability depends crucially on ￿2,
which can cross over several bifurcation values. When 0 < ￿1 + ￿1 + ￿2 + ￿2 < 1; the dynamics
13exhibits dampened oscillations around a BGP (this possibility is illustrated on Figure 1); when
￿1 + ￿1 + ￿2 + ￿2 = 1; the second eigenvalue is zero, there is no transitional dynamics, variables
jump directly to a BGP; when 1 < ￿1+￿1+￿2+￿2 < 2; there is a transitional dynamics toward
a BGP; when ￿1 + ￿1 + ￿2 + ￿2 = 2 the second eigenvalue is also equal to 1, the steady states
are unstable10; …nally, when ￿1 + ￿1 + ￿2 + ￿2 > 2 the BGP are also unstable. When stability
obtains, the initial conditions pick up a unique path that converges to a unique BGP on the
unidimensional manifold (30): therefore BGP depends both on initial capital stocks and on tax
policies.
Figure 1 here
Proposition 5 Assume parameters allows for BGP, i.e. (29) holds. Also, let there be increasing
returns in one country and decreasing returns in the other country. Then the highest long run
growth rate is associated to the country with increasing returns.
Proof. Proof. Appendix D.1.
So, a country with decreasing returns can experience a positive BGP! Actually, the positive
externality in production plays an essential role insofar as it allows, say, country j to bene…t
from the economic development in country i. In this context, the engine of growth for country j
is the growth in country i that stimulates, through the infrastructure externality channel, both
its production and its capital accumulation.
3.2.2 The case of unidirectional externalities
When there are no externalities at all and constant returns to scale, countries have independent
dynamics and di¤erent technologies or preferences may end up in di¤erent BGP. With bilateral
externalities, the heterogeneity of BGP disappear. But what for the intermediate case of an
unilateral externality? This is illustrative of the bulk of externality problems endowed with
geographical attributes. An international river is a good example: any public investment made
in the upstream country to improve the water quality bene…ts the downstream country, while
the converse is not true. There are about 200 such international rivers in the world, distributed
across the African, Asian, American and European continents. Egypt is the most spectacular
example with 97 % of its water resources originating outside its borders.
10In that case, the solutions are:
ut = u0 + [￿1v0 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿1) u0] t ;
vt = u0 + [￿1v0 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿1) u0] t :
14The focus is now on the special case of one-way technological externality. Assume in addition
the technology in one of the two countries exhibits constant returns to scale. More precisely:
￿i + ￿i = 1, ￿i = 0 ;
￿j + ￿j + ￿j S 1 :
(32)
Country i is assumed to have a technology with constant returns to domestic inputs, but is not
subject to the transboundary externality (￿i = 0). The other country bene…ts from the positive
e¤ects of the foreign investment in infrastructure (￿j > 0).
In this context, from (21), the equations describing capital accumulation become, respectively










The main consequence of the absence of an externality, for country i, is that it directly follows
a BGP where the economy grows at a constant rate gi = ￿i ￿1 (positive under the assumptions
of Proposition 3). What about the dynamics in country j?
Proposition 6 Assume Country j has decreasing returns with respect to the domestic factors
(￿j + ￿j < 1): Country j experiences a process of sustained growth, and its balanced growth rate
is:
i ) lower than country i’s balanced growth rate when ￿j + ￿j + ￿j < 1;
ii) equal to country i’s balanced growth rate when ￿j + ￿j + ￿j = 1;
iii) larger than country i’s balanced growth rate when ￿j + ￿j + ￿j > 1
Proof. The solution to the di¤erence equation (34) can be written as follows:










with ￿ = ￿j +￿j < 1 (to …nd this expression, simply express Kj1 as a function of Kj0; then Kj2
as a function of Kj1 (Kj0); thus as a function Kj2 (Kj0), and so on and so forth until date t.)


































11It is worth noting that the central argument used in the proof of the existence of a world equilibrium (see
proposition 1) lies in the fact that the two objectives are …nite. This result is straighforward once we consider
the dynamics (33) in region i and the utility function. It is also true for the dynamics (34) since proposition 1




t=0 by a single condition on the sequence
fKitg
1
t=0. Therefore, the dynamics given by (33)-(34) clearly corresponds to the world equilibrium de…ned in
section 3.1 when the restrictions (32) are set.









When ￿j=(1 ￿ ￿) < 1 (this is equivalent to the assumption ￿j + ￿j + ￿j < 1) and ￿i > 1;
necessarily 1 < ￿
￿j
1￿￿




i = ￿i : Finally, when ￿j=(1 ￿ ￿) > 1 (or ￿j + ￿j + ￿j > 1), then ￿j = ￿
￿j
1￿￿
i > ￿i :
So the property that country j’s capital stock can inde…nitely grow despite decreasing returns,
already found in the case of bilateral externalities, hold also with unidirectional externalities.
A word of warning: the previous example might give the impression that, with interdependent
economies, growth is guaranteed when at least one country has constant or increasing returns.
A counter-example is provided here. Assume:
￿i + ￿i < 1, ￿i = 0 ;
￿j + ￿j + ￿j = 1 :
(35)
The …rst country evolves independently under a regime of decreasing returns: it has no growth
in the long run. As a consequence, because infrastructure are necessary for the production in
country j, this country also experiences no growth in the long run.
4 Two rationales for taxation and provision of infrastructure
The previous section has investigated how interdependency of economies a¤ects the prospects of
growth. The next logical question is as follows: given the incentives of each local government
to free-ride on foreign investments, what role for coordination arises regarding growth? Popular
wisdom would probably reply: "from cooperation one expect increased growth rates". The
answers are more subtle, and sometimes surprising...
With a view to answering this question, this section will provide two important pieces of
information: i) under both the non cooperative and the centralized scenarios, tax rates are
constant, ii) those tax rates can be ranked.
By substituting the equilibrium decisions (12) and (17) into preferences, the per-period indi-
rect utility function for consumer i is given by:
Vi(Kit;Kjt;Git;Gjt) =
(
￿i ln(1 ￿ ￿it) + (￿i￿i + ￿j)lnGit + ￿i￿i lnKit
+ln(1 ￿ ￿jt) + (￿i￿i + ￿j)lnGjt + ￿j lnKjt + ￿i
)
;
where ￿i is a constant. The sum of the discounted functions Vi(:;:;:;:);i = 1;2; are the objectives
in the public authorities’ optimization problems.
164.1 Markov Perfect Equilibrium
In a markov perfect equilibrium (MPE), each government chooses the sequence of tax rates
f￿itg+1
t=0 that maximizes the discounted sum of per-period indirect utilities, given the markov

























Using dynamic programing tools, the MPE tax rates obtained are :
￿N
i = ￿￿i + ￿￿j
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿i ￿ ￿￿i + ￿￿i￿i
(1 ￿ ￿￿j ￿ ￿￿j)￿i + ￿￿j
￿
; (36)
for i;j = 1;2 (see Appendix E). Also, as can be seen from the details given in Appendix E, the
MPE is an equilibrium in dominant strategies.
The …rst component ￿￿i precisely corresponds to the solution with no interactions at all
between countries as studied by Glomm and Ravikumar (1994): the higher the impact of in-
frastructure in production (measured by ￿i), the higher the tax rate and the provision of the
domestic public good. Also, the lower the degree of impatience (lower discount factor) the lower
the tax rates and the investments12.
More interestingly, with interacting countries there is a second term that re‡ects their inter-
dependence: the larger the impact of domestic infrastructure on foreign production (represented
by ￿j), the higher the Nash tax rate ￿N
i . This property is due to the fact that country i’s con-
tribution tends to increase country j’s production and thus the amount of resources that it will
be willing to allocate to its own public good provision. In turn, the rise in the stock Gj will
bene…t the production in country i through the infrastructure externality channel. Moreover,
there exists an additional positive e¤ect that results from the consumption side: the production
of foreign good is also consumed at home. Thus, more foreign production means more utility.
The government takes into account this feedback e¤ect13 and provide a quantity of public good
higher than the one chosen in the case of pure autarky.
12When public infrastructure are a public good, obtained as the addition of public expenses at home and abroad,






it for i = 1;2, with Gt = I1t￿1 + I2t￿1; best responses are
more complex to analyze. There are no dominant strategies any longer and one can obtain explicit solutions only




2 = ￿￿; as in the single country case, and those
decisions are e¢cient. Details are available upon request.
13The bene…ts are perceived two periods after the investment.
17Moreover, one observes that ￿N
i decreases with the relative weight ￿i of the domestic good
in preferences once the following holds:
(1 ￿ ￿￿j ￿ ￿￿j)((1 ￿ ￿￿i ￿ ￿￿i) ￿ ￿2￿i￿j > 0 : (37)
This inequality is satis…ed under the assumption (8) on technology. Actually, a fall in ￿i means
that the consumer attaches less importance to the domestic good. Public authorities have then
the incentive to reinforce the …scal policy at the expense of the national product. This decision
implies a reduction of the resources devoted to both investment and global consumption but,
it also goes with an increase in the stock Gi meant to stimulate foreign production. Therefore,
preferences abroad remaining unchanged, this policy leads to a rise in the amount of the good
available on the market which, combined with a fall in the relative price pt, allows the domestic
consumer to e¤ectively change his consumption basket by purchasing a higher quantity of his
most desired good.
4.2 The centralized solution
The centralized solution (CS) singles out the sequences of tax rates f￿itg+1
t=0 and f￿jtg+1
t=0 that
maximize the sum of the two representative agents’ overall utilities. It appears as a natural
benchmark to assess the impact of strategic interaction and can be interpreted as a form of

























As before, using dynamic programing the expressions of the CS tax rates follow:
￿C
i = ￿￿i + ￿￿j
￿
(1 + ￿j)(1 ￿ ￿￿i ￿ ￿￿i) + (1 + ￿i)￿￿i
(1 + ￿i)(1 ￿ ￿￿j ￿ ￿￿j) + (1 + ￿j)￿￿j
￿
; (38)
for i;j = 1;2.
The following section compares the MPE and the CS tax rates, not only in the general frame-
work with diversi…ed consumers developed until now, but also when the agents value only their
domestic good, a case we refer to as domestic-prone consumers, when there are only production
externalities and countries live in autarky as far as consumption is concerned. The corresponding
outcomes (with the superscript "A" for autarky) are obtained by letting the relative weights ￿i
and ￿j tend to in…nity in expressions (36) and (38):
14However it does not give a Pareto optimal outcome. This is due to the instrument under consideration: a ‡at
tax on income modi…es private agents’ decisions. A lump-sum tax would avoid those distortions...
18￿AN
it = ￿￿i +
￿2￿i￿j
1 ￿ ￿￿j ￿ ￿￿j
;
￿AC
it = ￿￿i + ￿￿j
1 ￿ ￿￿i ￿ ￿￿i + ￿￿i
1 ￿ ￿￿j ￿ ￿￿j + ￿￿j
:
5 Strategic taxations and departure from e¢ciency
To understand how strategic incentives fail to realize the centralized optimum and the conse-
quences on growth rates, it is important to add more precision about tax levels, under both the
non cooperative scenario and the centralized one. The goal is to rank MPE and CS tax rates.
The results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 7 Under Assumption (8):
(i) with domestic-prone consumers, MPE tax rates are lower than CS tax rates:
￿AN
i < ￿AC
i ; 8i = 1;2 :
(ii) with diversi…ed consumers, the ranking depends on preferences:
￿N
i ￿ (￿)￿C
i , ￿i￿j ￿ (￿)1; 8i;j = 1;2 :
Proof. part (i): proving ￿AN
i < ￿AC
i boils down to verifying the following inequality:
(1 ￿ ￿￿j ￿ ￿￿j)(1 ￿ ￿￿i ￿ ￿￿i) ￿ ￿2￿i￿j > 0 ;





(1 ￿ ￿￿j ￿ ￿￿j)(1 ￿ ￿￿i ￿ ￿￿i) ￿ ￿2￿i￿j
￿
(1 ￿ ￿i￿j) ￿ 0 ;
Since the …rst term of the above product is positive under Assumption (8), the ranking is given
by the sign of 1￿ ￿i ￿j.
With domestic-prone consumers there is no trade, and spillovers disseminate only through the
channel of production technologies. This is a positive externalities framework and, as expected,
non-cooperative countries ignore their positive impact on the other country and invest too little
in infrastructure.
With diversi…ed consumers, there exists a second channel of interdependence, namely the
consumption of the good produced abroad. As a result, the ranking between Nash and centralized
tax rates is crucially bound to preferences. For instance, if each country prefers its own good
(￿i;￿j ￿ 1), then we have ￿N
i ￿ ￿C
i ; 8i = 1;2. In a sense, the concern for the foreign good is too
small to modify the previous logic of positive input externalities. But, when each country pays
19more attention to the good produced abroad (￿i;￿j ￿ 1), the ranking of tax rates is reversed.
There is overcontribution to public infrastructure compared to the socially optimal level, that is
￿N
i ￿ ￿C
i ; 8i = 1;2. The intuition is as follows. Country i neglects its home production to invest
heavily in infrastructure, for this is a way to induce a large production of the good it values the
most produced in country j; and this exerts a downward pressure on price (see expression 16.)
Country j does the same reasoning and both countries settle for too much consumption of their
home commodity along with ine¢ciently high tax rates.
Finally, in the mixed cases where one country prefers the domestic good whereas the other
country prefers the foreign good, for instance ￿1 > 1; ￿2 < 1, the two previous logics are at work
and the sign of 1 ￿ ￿i￿j indicates which one prevails.15
The next part of the analysis deals with dynamics. We more precisely focus on several
scenarios regarding the conditions of sustained growth in the two countries.
5.1 Ine¢cient growth rates
5.1.1 The case of constant returns
The properties of economic dynamics drawn so far apply both to strategic investments and to
centralized investments. It remains to investigates what distinguishes the two scenarios. For
instance, could strategic investments in infrastructure improve (or on the contrary jeopardize)
the two countries’ prospects of growth? A technical property is …rst required.
Lemma 1 Assume constant returns to scale in both countries. Growth rates in country i are
all increasing in ￿i i¤ ￿i ￿ ￿i. Under the same condition, growth rates in country j are all
increasing in ￿i:
Proof. See appendix F.
From the expression of MPE tax rates and CS tax rates, (36) and (38), notice that necessarily
￿￿i ￿ ￿C
i ;￿N
i : But it need not be true that ￿C
i ;￿N
i ￿ ￿i :
Requiring a positive impact of taxation on all growth rates is of course very demanding.
For tax rates that would exceed the required thresholds, a small variation of taxes could have
a negative impact on growth at some date and a positive impact at another date. For instance
assume an increase in the tax rate ￿i; from period 0 onwards. It does not necessarily bene…t to
capital accumulation in country i. Actually, this rise has two opposite e¤ects. Other things equal,
it implies a rise in the stock of infrastructure available at the next period (Gi1) which tends to
increase production (Yi1). This increase in production stimulates investment (Ii1) in physical
capital at period 1 and capital accumulation in next period (Ki2). And it also means a rise in
15We note that result i) and ii) are akin to Datta and Mirman (2000)’s conclusions. These authors show, in a
dynamic game of investment, that if regions have identical preferences (which would mean here ￿i￿j = 1), then
the Nash equilibrium coincides with the centralized solution.
20the tax base that positively a¤ects the …nancing of infrastructure (Gi2). On the other hand, the
increase in ￿i comes at the expense of current consumption and investment. This reduction of
capital at period 1 (Ki1), and therefore of production (Yi1) leads two periods ahead to a fall in
both capital stock (Ki2) and the public good (Gi2)... In this context, imposing a tax rate lower
than ￿i is a mean to ensure the positive e¤ect dominates.
Interestingly enough, the same property, following the same condition, appears in Barro
(1990). But it is restricted to the long run growth rates. This generalization in the two-country
framework (and for growth rates at any date) was not obvious in the …rst place, but upon
re‡ection it comes as no surprise. Due to the transboundary externalities, the e¤ects of a
rise in ￿i do not stop at country i’s frontier. More domestic infrastructure (Gi1) means more
foreign production (Yj1, to an extent measured by ￿j). Consequently, it favours both capital
accumulation (Kj2) and infrastructure provision (Gj2). In other words, at a two periods horizon,
the increase in ￿i indirectly bene…ts to country i through the positive externality that links the
production to the stock of public good.
The analysis of the consequences of a rise in the tax rate ￿j on git is very similar. An increase
in ￿j has …rst a positive direct e¤ect on production and capital accumulation in this country
once ￿j ￿ ￿j. It tends to reduce the ratio Ki2=Kj2 and so to improve the potential of growth
in country i (see equation (26)). Moreover, it stimulates the provision of infrastructure at home
(Gj1) and positively a¤ects production, capital accumulation and growth in country i. Therefore,
the single condition ￿j ￿ ￿j guarantees that an increase in ￿j amounts to a rise in git.
It is now possible to compare the growth rates obtained in the four possible con…gurations,
domestic-prone consumers versus diversi…ed consumers, Nash versus cooperation.
Proposition 8 If ￿i > 1 for i = 1;2; with ￿i < ￿j , and if furthermore ￿AC
i ￿ ￿i and ￿C
j ￿ ￿j;
then




ii) with diversi…ed consumers, a similar ranking holds, gN
it < gC
it for i = 1;2:
Proof. If ￿i > 1 for i = 1;2 and, for instance, ￿i < ￿j, then it is possible to rank the tax rates









Therefore it is su¢cient to impose ￿AC
i ￿ ￿i and ￿C
j ￿ ￿j for Proposition 1 to apply.
Remark 1 The statement of Proposition 5 rests on the condition ￿AC
i ￿ ￿i and ￿C
j ￿ ￿j; which
is an assumption on endogenous variables. Those endogenous variables are of course functions
of the model parameters, and one may prefer a statement that makes explicit the conditions on
21those parameters under which Proposition 8 holds. This can be done as follows. First de…ne the
functions
￿i(x;y) = ￿￿j
(1 ￿ ￿￿i ￿ ￿￿i)(1 + y) + ￿￿i(1 + x)
(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
(1 ￿ ￿￿j ￿ ￿￿j)(1 + x) + ￿￿j(1 + y)
￿ ; i;j = 1;2; i 6= j:
and then replace the assumption ￿AC
i ￿ ￿i and ￿C
j ￿ ￿j by ￿i ￿ ￿i(0;0) and ￿j ￿ ￿j(￿j;￿i):
From a methodological point of view, this might be preferred, but it is more di¢cult to interpret.
Remark 2 The ranking of strategic and centralized growth rates applies not only in the long run
but also in the transition.
The most spectacular consequence of the under-investment problem exhibited in Proposition
8 is when centralized decisions allow for growth whereas Nash decisions does not.
Corollary 1 (Sustainability and cooperation) As in Proposition 8 assume ￿i > 1 for i =
1;2; with ￿i < ￿j , and ￿AC
i ￿ ￿i and ￿C















; i = 1;2;
then there is no long run growth at MPE tax rates, whereas countries experience positive long
run growth rates under the centralized scenario.
Proof. Under the mentioned conditions on parameters Ai the functions ￿1;￿2 evaluated at MPE
tax rates are equal to unity, therefore the long run growth rate are zero. On the other hand,
according to Proposition 1 growth rates are larger, therefore positive, under the centralized
scenario when ￿i > 1 for i = 1;2; with ￿i < ￿j , and ￿AC
i ￿ ￿i and ￿C
j ￿ ￿j (or equivalently
￿i ￿ ￿i(0;0) and ￿j ￿ ￿j(￿j;￿i)):
There are many ways to de…ne sustainability. If it is understood as the simple idea of "en-
during growth", then it is clear that in some circumstances sustainability does not rest only on
production possibilities: it also requires cooperation.
It should be stressed that the conditions of Proposition 8 (and Corollary 1) are su¢cient but
not necessary for the property of too little growth at MPE public investments. Figures 2a and
2b illustrate this, with numerical values such that both MPE tax rates and CS tax rates fall
outside the set of values for which the proposition applies.
Figures 2a and 2b here
But for too large values of tax rates, outside the admissible range, the negative e¤ect of
taxation on growth rates dominates and there is too much growth at MPE tax rates, even with
consumers who prefer their domestic good, as illustrated in Figures 3a and 3b below.
Figures 3a and 3b here
22Another rationale for too much growth at MPE is when households value less their domestic
good.
Proposition 9 With diversi…ed consumers who prefer the foreign good (￿i < 1), if ￿N
i ￿ ￿i for
i = 1;2 there is too much growth at MPE tax rates: gC
it < gN
it for i = 1;2.
Proof. If ￿i;￿j < 1 and, for instance, ￿i < ￿j, again it is possible to rank the tax rates associated











i , i = 1;2). For each country, ￿N
i is the highest rate. Therefore, it is su¢cient to
impose ￿N
i ￿ ￿i ; i = 1;2 to satisfy the conditions of Proposition 1 and to conclude.
Remark 3 Here again it is possible to state this result by making explicit the required assump-
tions on parameters, since ￿N
i ￿ ￿i , ￿i(￿i ￿ 1;0) ￿ ￿i:
There exists the widespread belief, as far as growth is concerned, that more is necessarily
better. The last proposition destroys this belief. The intuition is simple: investment is required
for growth, which is good for future consumption and welfare, but it comes at the expense of
current generations, that is the generations that are valued the most in the discounted criterion
used to assess e¢ciency. Clearly it is possible to invest too much. Proposition 9 pins down this
possibility. At non cooperative tax rate, because domestic households prefer the foreign good,
local decision maker i neglects domestic consumption and favor investment as an indirect way to
increase the foreign production and to consume more of it. Decision maker j behaves similarly
and both countries settle for too much production of their domestic good resulting from too high
investments therefore too much growth.
And getting back to the sustainability issue, it is easy to highlight a provocative role for
competition:
Corollary 2 (Sustainability and competition) As in Proposition 9 assume ￿i < 1 and
￿N















; i = 1;2;
then there is no long run growth at centralized tax rates, whereas countries experience positive
long run growth rates under the non cooperative scenario.
Proof. similar to the proof of Corollary 1. Under the mentioned conditions on parameters Ai
the functions ￿1;￿2 evaluated at cs tax rates are equal to unity, therefore the long run growth
rate are zero. On the other hand, growth rates are larger, therefore positive, under the non
cooperative scenario when ￿i < 1 and ￿N
i ￿ ￿i for i = 1;2:
23Sustainability here, as an objective for society, seems to lack normative foundations. What is
at stake here is the relationship between di¤erent possible goals, given that in some circumstances
they may end up in similar injunctions whereas in other situations they may enter into con‡ict.
Cooperation has also a role to play in the transition. To see this, two particular cases are
worth noting, for their ability to be easily interpreted and for the conclusions they deliver. Let
the capital stocks at date zero and tax rates be such that the initial imbalance falls short of the
long run imbalance, both under MPE and CS scenarios:













Let also the households prefer their domestic good, so that long run growth factors at MPE












Under Conditions 1 and 2, Proposition 4 indicates that country i has positive growth rates
at any date whereas country j experiences a initial recession at MPE tax rates; Proposition 4
also states that both countries have positive growth rates at any date under CS tax rates. This
proves the following:
Proposition 10 Assume constant returns to scale. Let the households prefer their domestic
good. Let the initial imbalance of private capital stock satisfy Conditions 1 and 2. Then co-
operation prevents country j from undergoing an economic recession during the …rst stages of
development.
There is not enough investment at MPE tax rates. Increased e¢ciency calls for higher growth
rates and no recession in the economy.
The second interesting example is obtained when households prefer the foreign good; MPE












Substituting Condition 3 for 2, while maintaining Condition 1, we learn from Proposition
4 that both countries have positive growth rates at any date at MPE tax rates; as for CS tax
rates, Proposition 4 states that country i has positive growth rates at any dates, but country j
experiences negative growth rates before recovering. Thus:
24Proposition 11 Assume constant returns to scale. Let the households prefer the foreign good.
Let the initial imbalance of private capital stocks satisfy Conditions 1 and 3. Then cooperation
calls for an initial recession in country j whereas strategic investment does not.
In the case described in Proposition 11, the centralized level of imbalance is so far away from
the initial level of imbalance that an initial recession in country j is called upon to reduce the
gap between capital stocks; at the same time the discrepancy between the MPE imbalance at
the initial level is not so large to call also for an initial recession.
5.1.2 The case with di¤erent balanced growth rates
To complete the analysis, one may wonder whether the consequences of cooperation established
in some previous propositions carry over to cases where we dispense with the assumption of
constant returns to scale in both countries.
Proposition 12 Assume parameters allows for BGP, i.e. (29) holds. Also, let there be increas-
ing returns in one country and decreasing returns in the other country. Then:
1. when households prefer the domestic (respectively foreign) commodity, cooperation increases
(respectively diminishes) long run growth rates.
2. cooperation increases (respectively decreases) the gap between balanced growth rates when
consumers prefer their domestic commodity (respectively the foreign commodity).
Proof. See Appendix D.2.
Figures 4a and 4b provide an illustration. Notice that there is too little growth at MPE
tax rates. This is not surprising since the consumers of this example prefer the domestic good
(remember Proposition 5). Also, it seems in this example that the gap between growth rates is
larger under cooperation. The following statement clarify this last property of cooperation:
Proposition 13 Let the parameters be as in (32) but without constant returns in country j.
Then:
1. cooperation increases (respectively decreases) the balanced growth rates when consumers
prefer their domestic commodity (respectively the foreign commodity).
2. cooperation increases (respectively decreases) the gap between balanced growth rates when
consumers prefer their domestic commodity (respectively the foreign commodity).
25Proof. The proof of the …rst point directly follows from Proposition 7 and the properties of
￿i and ￿j as functions of tax rates. Regarding the second point, as soon as ￿j=(1 ￿ ￿) 6= 1 (or
equivalently ￿j + ￿j + ￿j 6= 1), the gap








is an increasing function of ￿i 2 [1;+1[; and we know from Proposition 5 that ￿i computed
at CS tax rates is larger (respectively lower) than MPE tax rates when consumers prefer the
domestic commodity (respectively the foreign commodity).
In the asymmetric situation under consideration, MPE tax rates and CS tax rates for country
j are the same (to check that, see the expressions for tax rates when ￿i = 0). Therefore country j
growth rates are also the same under either scenario. When consumers prefer the domestic good,
cooperation requires to increase country i growth rate, hence a higher gap. On the contrary,
when consumers value more the foreign good, e¢ciency calls for a lower growth rate for country
i, therefore a smaller gap between countries’ growth rates.
Figures 4a and 4b here
6 Conclusion
This paper deals with the consequences of interdependent public investments on growth. To
do so it constructs a two-country model with public infrastructure as inputs in the production
technologies. Each country has three types of agents: …rms, households and a local government.
Local governments levy a share of the domestic households’ income to …nance the provision of
infrastructure that improves the e¢ciency of private inputs in production. In addition, public
investment in one country is assumed to produce positive spillovers on the foreign production.
Public authorities behave non cooperatively when they choose the amount to invest in infrastruc-
ture while private agents take the public policy as given when making their trade-o¤s.
In this setting, the main results can be summarized as follows.
First, when technologies exhibit constant returns to scale in reproducible inputs, we show
that the two countries’ growth rates di¤er during the transitional dynamics. This gap in growth
performance results from the existing heterogeneity among countries. In fact, countries are
endowed with di¤erent initial capital stocks, have di¤erent technologies and preferences, and
di¤erent public policies. Due to the interdependence between countries, these di¤erences play
no role in the long run and countries tend to the same balanced growth rate. However, there
is no convergence in levels of consumption and output since there remains a discrepancy in
production levels that is explained by distinct local speci…cities. Next, we prove that the quest
for e¢ciency does not necessarily means higher growth rates. More precisely, when households
in each country prefer the commodity produced abroad, local governments have the incentive
26to strenghten their …scal policy to promote the production of their citizens’ most preferred
good, namely the foreign good. This strategy goes hand-in-hand with an overcontribution to
infrastructure and implies that Nash growth rates are higher than the centralized ones. It is
also established that cooperation can prevent an economic shortening in one country in the
early stages of development when households prefer their domestic good, but on the contrary
cooperation may call for an initial economic downsizing, that would not occur under strategic
investments, when households prefer the foreign good.
Second, assuming away constant returns to scale, growth in both countries is still possible,
even when one country has diminishing returns to scale provided that it can bene…t from a
growing externality from the other country. Countries cease to converge towards the same
growth rates. The country with the most advantageous technology grows faster. Finally, it
is established that cooperation increases (respectively decreases) the gap between growth rates
when households prefer the domestic (respectively the foreign) commodity.
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Steady state
Parameter values for Figure 1
￿i= 0:2 ￿i= 0:2 ￿i= 0:6 ￿i= ￿ = 0:8 Ai= 7 ki0= 1 ￿i= 1:5
￿j= 0:2 ￿j= 0:2 ￿j= 0:6 ￿j= ￿ = 0:8 Aj= 7 kj0= 2 ￿j= 1:5
Tax rates for Figure 1
￿i ' 0:6; ￿j ' 0:6:
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Centralized solution steady state
Parameter values for Figures 2a and 2b
￿i= 0:3 ￿i= 0:5 ￿i= 0:2 ￿i= ￿ = 0:8 Ai= 7 ki0= 1 ￿i= 1:5
￿j= 0:3 ￿j= 0:5 ￿j= 0:2 ￿j= ￿ = 0:8 Aj= 7 kj0= 2 ￿j= 1:5
Tax rates for Figures 2a and 2b
￿N
i ' 0:53; ￿N
j ' 0:53; ￿C
i ' 0:56; ￿C
j ' 0:56:
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Centralized solution steady state
Parameter values for Figures 3a and 3b
￿i= 0:4 ￿i= 0:3 ￿i= 0:3 ￿i= ￿ = 0:8 Ai= 7 ki0= 1 ￿i= 1:5
￿j= 0:4 ￿j= 0:3 ￿j= 0:3 ￿j= ￿ = 0:8 Aj= 7 kj0= 2 ￿j= 1:5
Tax rates for Figures 3a and 3b
￿N
i ' 0:45; ￿N
j ' 0:45; ￿C
i ' 0:48; ￿C
j ' 0:48:
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Country j’s CS steady state
Parameter values for Figures 4a and 4b
￿i= 0:5 ￿i= 0:5 ￿i= 0 ￿i= ￿ = 0:6 Ai= 7 ki0= 1 ￿i= 1:5
￿j= 0:3 ￿j= 0:4 ￿j= 0:2 ￿j= ￿ = 0:6 Aj= 7 kj0= 3 ￿j= 1:5
Tax rates for Figures 4a and 4b
￿N
i ' 0:35; ￿N
j ' 0:24; ￿C
i ' 0:37; ￿C
j ' 0:24:
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33Appendix
A Derivation of the ￿-CE
The Hamiltonian associated with the arti…cial planning problem (11) reads as:









it ￿ Kit+1 ￿ ciit ￿ ptcijt
i
;
where ￿t+1 is the shadow price of the resource constraint.






























As in Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) let us postulate, and afterwards con…rm, that optimal
decisions are linear functions of the after tax income. In particular
ciit = miRi;t ; (43)













































34Or, changing the time period









































￿i￿i￿ + mi￿i + mi
Ri;t :
By identi…cation of this last expression with (45), a simple equation for mi is obtained:
￿i￿i￿
￿i￿i￿ + mi￿i + mi











(1 ￿ ￿i￿)Ri;t ;
cijt =
￿i
￿ipt (1 + ￿i)
(1 ￿ ￿i￿)Ri;t ;
Ki;t+1 = ￿i￿Ri;t ;
as given by (12), (14) and (13) in the text.
The interested reader may want to check that this planning problem combines a static op-
timization problem (how to allocate optimally at each period the resources net of investment
between the consumption of the two goods) with an intertemporal problem (the trade-o¤ be-
tween consumption and investment).
B Conditions for balanced growth
A su¢cient condition for balanced growth is when ￿i ￿ 1; 8i = 1;2. From (22), remember that









35The logic of the proof is to exhibit conditions under which ￿i = ￿i(￿i;￿j) is increasing in both
arguments and bounded below by 1.
The partial derivative @￿i
@￿j is always positive, whereas @￿i
@￿i ￿ 0 for all ￿i ￿ ￿i .
Under assumption ￿i ￿ ￿i






￿ Ai￿i￿(1 ￿ ￿￿i) :
In addition, when Ai ￿ 1
￿￿i(1￿￿￿i) then








Under the assumption ￿j ￿
￿j
1+￿￿j ; we also have






Finally, restricting attention to tax rates (￿i;￿j) that belongs to [￿￿i;￿i] ￿ [￿￿j;￿j]; since @￿i
@￿i;
@￿i
@￿j ￿ 0, one has ￿i = ￿i(￿i;￿j) ￿ ￿i(￿￿i;￿￿j) ￿ 1; 8k:
The same logic applies to ascertain that ￿j ￿ 1.
C Proof of Proposition 5 (transitional growth)
Remember that the expressions of growth rates are given by:
git = ￿iu
￿￿i
t ￿ 1 (46)
gjt = ￿ju
￿j
t ￿ 1 (47)
The sign and the evolution of both growth rates mainly follow from the properties of the sequence
futg: if u0 ￿ ~ u then ut is monotonically increasing until it reaches its steady state level ~ u =
(￿i=￿j)
1
1￿￿. Otherwise (u0 > ~ u), ut is monotonically decreasing towards ~ u.
Assume …rst that u0 ￿ ~ u. Then u0 ￿ u1 ￿ u2 ￿ ::: ￿ ~ u. According to (46) and (47), it
implies that git is decreasing while gjt is increasing during the transition.
- By assumption gi ￿ 0; which is equivalent to ￿i ￿ ~ u￿i: Thus ￿i ￿ ~ u￿i ￿ u
￿i
t 8t since
ut ￿ ~ u 8t; which means git ￿ 0; 8t:
- when in addition u
￿￿j





u0 ￿ ut 8t. This means gjt ￿ 0 8t.
36- on the contrary when ￿j < u
￿￿j







and by assumption gj ￿ 0; necessarily 9t such that ￿j < u
￿￿j
t for all t < t (so gjt < 0; t < t),
and u
￿￿j
t ￿ ￿j for all t ￿ t (so gjt ￿ 0; t ￿ t).
The case where ~ u < u0 can be analyzed along similar lines and is left to the reader.
D Di¤erent growth rates along the BGP
D.1 Proof of Proposition 5
The proof comes from the analysis of the system (31). At a steady state (u;v) of the log
transforms of growth rates (so at a BGP), necessarily:
u =
￿1
1 ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿1
v =
1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿2
￿2
v = ￿v ;
with ￿i 6= 0;￿i + ￿i 6= 0; i = 1;2: It is easy to check that ￿ > 1 (respectively ￿ < 1) when there
are increasing (decreasing) returns to scale in country 1 while there are decreasing (increasing)
returns to scale in country 2. Then any steady state is such that u > v (respectively u < v),
which proves Proposition 5.
D.2 Proof of Proposition 12
The demonstration of Proposition 12 follows the one of proposition 5 and is made recursively.
Note …rst that u0 and v0 are increasing functions of ￿1 and ￿2 respectively, which in turn are
increasing functions of ￿1 and ￿2 provided that ￿i ￿ ￿i ; i = 1;2 (see the details given in Appendix
C). From (31) observe also that u1 and v1 are increasing functions of u0 and v0. Therefore u1
and v1 are increasing functions of ￿1 and ￿2. Assume next that this property holds for ut and vt
; to complete the proof it remains to show that the property necessarily hold for ut+1 and vt+1.
But this is obvious, by inspection again of the dynamic system (31) that shows ut+1 and vt+1






￿ 0 ; 8t: (48)
This property holds also at steady states, so point 2 is obvious since centralized tax rates are
higher (respectively lower) than MPE tax rates when households prefer the domestic (respectively
foreign) commodity. As for point 3, because u = ￿v ; with ￿ 6= 1; an increase in tax rates
produces an increase of the gap between steady states. That is, when there is under-taxation
at MPE (when consumers prefer their domestic good), cooperation increases the gap between
growth rates. When there is over-taxation at MPE (when consumers prefer the foreign good),
cooperation decreases the gap.
37E Markov perfect equilibrium tax rates
Let vi(Kit;Git;Kjt;Gjt) be country i’s value function for the subgame starting at date t with
stock variables Kit;Git;Kjt;Gjt inherited from past decisions. In the Cobb-Douglas game frame-
work at hand, it makes sense to guess value functions of the following form:
vi(Kit;Git;Kjt;Gjt) = Di lnKit + Fi lnGit + Hi lnKjt + Ji lnGjt ; i;j = 1;2; i 6= j;
where Di;Fi;Hi and Ji are some constants to be determined. At a subgame perfect equilibrium
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= 0; i = 1;2:
Their solutions read as:
￿it =
￿Fi
￿i + ￿Di + ￿Fi
; i = 1;2; 8t: (49)
Inserting those expressions into the Bellman equations, and because those equations hold for any
values of the stock variables, identi…cation of similar terms ends up in the following system of
equations:
Di = ￿i(￿i + ￿Di + ￿Fi) ; (50)
Fi = ￿i(￿i + ￿Di + ￿Fi) + ￿j (1 + ￿Hi + ￿Ji) ; (51)
Hi = ￿j (1 + ￿Hi + ￿Ji) ; (52)
Ji = ￿i (￿i + ￿Di + ￿Fi) + ￿j (1 + ￿Hi + ￿Ji) : (53)
Note, from (50):















38Substituting the l.h.s. of those expressions into the system above, a simpler two dimensional



















￿i (1 ￿ ￿j￿ ￿ ￿j￿) + ￿￿i￿j
￿
+ ￿j (1 ￿ ￿i￿)
(1 ￿ ￿i￿ ￿ ￿i￿)(1 ￿ ￿j￿ ￿ ￿j￿) ￿ ￿2￿i￿j
: (56)
Using (49) and (54) to get rid o¤ Di in the expression of ￿it; one has:
￿i =
￿Fi (1 ￿ ￿i￿)
￿i + ￿Fi
:
Plugging (56) into the above expression and simplifying:
￿i =
￿￿i￿i [1 ￿ ￿ (￿j + ￿j)] + ￿2￿i￿i￿j + ￿￿j (1 ￿ ￿￿i)
￿i [1 ￿ ￿ (￿j + ￿j)] + ￿￿j
;




￿i [1 ￿ ￿ (￿j + ￿j)] + ￿￿j
￿
￿ ￿2￿i￿j + ￿2￿i￿i￿j + ￿￿j (1 ￿ ￿￿i)
￿i [1 ￿ ￿ (￿j + ￿j)] + ￿￿j
;
therefore:
￿i = ￿￿i + ￿￿j
1 ￿ ￿￿i ￿ ￿￿i + ￿￿i￿i
￿i [1 ￿ ￿ (￿j + ￿j)] + ￿￿j
;
as reported in the text.
F Proof of Lemma 1












































































































(￿i ￿ ￿j ￿ ￿i) :







(￿i + ￿j)￿i(1 ￿ ￿i)
￿
(￿i + ￿j)(￿i ￿ ￿i) ￿ ￿i(1 ￿ ￿t)(￿i ￿ ￿j ￿ ￿i)
￿
:
Direct calculations show that
@git
@￿i ￿ 0 8t is equivalent to:




Evaluated at t = 0, this condition becomes ￿i ￿ ￿i , which is therefore necessary to ensure
@git
@￿i ￿ 0 8t.

































(￿j ￿ ￿j + ￿i) :







(￿i + ￿j)￿j(1 ￿ ￿j)
￿
(￿i + ￿j) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿t)(￿j ￿ ￿j + ￿i)
￿
;
and the following equivalence holds:
@git
@￿j ￿ 0 $
￿j ￿ ￿j +
￿i￿t + ￿j
1 ￿ ￿t
which is always veri…ed when ￿j ￿ ￿j; because the second term in the l.h.s. is positive.
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